We examine Census and survey data from Australia, Canada, and the United States spanning the 1991-2011 period to provide new evidence on the potential for immigration policy to influence the labour market performance of skilled immigrants. Our estimates for all three countries point to improvements across cohorts of male university-educated immigrants in employment rates and weekly earnings relative to university-educated native-born men entering labour markets at the same time, the timing of which are broadly consistent with immigration policy reforms. Nonetheless, the gains appear relatively modest in comparison to a substantial and persistent performance advantage of U.S. immigrants, which is evident across the earnings distribution and among immigrants from a common origin country. Given that there is increasingly little to distinguish the Australian and U.S. systems of employment-based immigration, we interpret the U.S. advantage as primarily reflecting the relative positive selectivity of U.S. immigrants owing to higher U.S. returns to skill and the relative economic security of Australia's and Canada's social welfare systems.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a push in the U.S. and in a number of European countries, including the U.K. and Germany, for governments to adopt `point systems' for screening prospective immigrants on human capital criteria. The appeal of a `point system' reflects not only concerns about the potential adverse effects of unskilled migrant flows on public finances and wage inequality, but also the lure of a growing body of research emphasizing the potential for skilled immigrants to raise economic growth through their contributions to international trade flows, entrepreneurship, and innovation. Evidence that skilled immigrants are not only more innovative than their native-born counterparts, but also have the potential to produce positive productivity spillovers on their native-born coworkers (Hunt and GauthierLoiselle 2010) , goes a long way in making the economic case for immigration where public opinion is growing increasingly critical.
Ironically, at the same time that the U.S. and Europe push for `point systems,' Australia and Canada have been struggling to find policy remedies to address the disappointing labour market performance of their own skilled immigrant populations.
1 Beginning in the late 1990s, Australia made significant revisions to its 'point system' introducing pre-migration language testing and credential assessment. In addition, it implemented a `two-step' immigration system, in large part mimicking the U.S.'s own system of relying on employers, rather than governments, to initially screen skilled migrant workers. In the face of evidence that recent Canadian university-educated immigrants were lagging behind their Australian counterparts (Hawthorne 2008) , the Canadian government made similar reforms to its `point system' in the mid-2000s and also began to increasingly draw on skilled migrants employed on temporary work permits and student visas as a source of new permanent residents.
To outside observers, these contrasting policy directions suggest lack of consensus on what optimal immigrant selection policies look like. This is understandable when one considers that the economics literature offers little evidence on what works. In fact, if anything, the evidence suggests that differences in immigrant screening policies are not what underlie differences in the economic performance of immigrants across countries or within countries over time. For example, Duleep and Regets (1992) compare immigrants in Canada and the U.S. using the 1980/1981 Censuses focusing on Asian and European immigrants and conclude that the Canadian `points system' has little impact on immigrant earnings relative to the U.S. system based on family-reunification objectives. Similarly, Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003) compare the English-language fluency, education, and income of Australian, Canadian, and U.S. immigrants and find little difference in skills among immigrants originating from similar regions.
The economics literature instead emphasizes two key factors largely falling outside immigration policy's scope of influence. First, beginning with the seminal work of Chiswick (1978) , studies of immigrant earnings have emphasized the role of differences in the unobservable skills, abilities, or ambitions of immigrants (or what much of the current literature has referred to, generically, as migrant "quality") across and within destination countries arising from migrant's own decisions about whether to migrate and where. Applying a standard Roy model to the migrant's settlement decision, Borjas (1987) shows that immigrants may be positively or negatively selected on their skills depending on the relative incentives of workers from the lower and upper end of the origin-country skill distribution to migrate. For example, destination countries whose social welfare systems offer a safety net to those at the lower end of the income distribution will tend to attract immigrants with relatively lower levels of skill, whereas countries with high returns to skill will tend to attract higher skill migrants. Examining migrant flows to Australia, Canada, and the U.S. prior to 1980, Borjas (1993) finds that while `point systems' may have some potential in raising the observable human capital characteristics of immigrants, earnings differentials between immigrant groups across destination countries largely reflect unobservable skill differences driven by host-country differences in income inequality. More recently, Jasso and Rosenzweig (2008) examine the role of world skill prices and proximity of origin to destination countries and conclude that: "there is no evidence that selection mechanisms used to screen employment migrants … play a significant role in affecting the characteristics of skill migration."
At the same time, an opposing literature has argued that variations in immigrant labour market performance, particularly across arrival cohorts within destination countries, do not reflect migrant "quality" differences, but rather the influence of destination-country labour markets, including differences in wage structures and labour market institutions. In accounting for the deteriorating labour market outcomes of immigrant arrival cohorts through the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. researchers have emphasized broader wage inequality trends affecting all workers, which have exacerbated the relative earnings gaps of immigrants who tend to fall at the lower end of the earnings distribution (Lalonde and Topel 1992; Butcher and Dinardo 2002; Lubotsky 2011) . Canadian researchers have, on the other hand, emphasized the deteriorating labour market earnings of all new labour market entrants in Canada, both foreign-and native-born (Green and Worswick 2012) . Finally, Antecol, Kuhn, and Trejo (2006) , provide evidence that the greater regulation of Australian labour markets results in immigration assimilation in employment rates, whereas in Canada and the U.S. where labour markets are more competitive, immigrant assimilation is more evident in the relative progression of immigrants' weekly earnings.
In this article, we examine comparable Census and survey data from Australia, Canada, and the United States spanning the 1991-2011 period to provide new evidence on the potential for policy to influence the labour market performance of new immigrants. To do so, we consider whether there is evidence of improvements in the relative employment rates and weekly earnings of university-educated foreign-born men arriving in Australia and Canada during the 2000s consistent with their immigration policy reforms. To attribute the observed changes in immigrant outcomes to policy, one of course has to be careful to account for the effects of concomitant changes in migrant selectivity or broader changes in Australian and Canadian labour markets. 2 To do so, we employ a three-pronged strategy. First, we compare the observed patterns in the relative performance of Australian and Canadian immigrants to their U.S. counterparts, where not only did immigration policy remain essentially unchanged through the 2000s, but changes in income inequality, that we would expect to affect migrant selectivity, were broadly similar (at least beyond the extreme tails of the distribution). Second, we compare the performance of immigrants with a common country of birth -China, India, the Philippines and North America -to account for the effects of selectivity incentives emanating from origin countries. Finally, to net out the effects of changes in destination country labour markets, we follow Green and Worswick (2012) strategy of comparing immigrant earnings and employment outcomes to those of native-born workers entering the destination country labour markets at the same time.
The existing literature reports a significant deterioration in immigrant labour market outcomes through the 1980s and 1990s in Canada (Baker and Benjamin 1994; Grant 1999; Aydemir and Skuterud 2005 ) and the U.S. (Borjas 1985) . In contrast, we find no evidence of deteriorating outcomes through the 1990s and 2000s. Rather, our estimates point to relative gains in the performance of universityeducated immigrants in all three countries, the timing of which are broadly consistent with immigration policy reforms, but not with the expected patterns in migrant selectivity based on the relative evolution of income inequality in the three countries. In particular, we identify gains concomitant with the growth of the U.S. H-1B program in the latter half of the 1990s; with the ramping-up of Australia's `point system' and shift towards `two-step' immigration in the late 1990s; and with Canada's similar reforms in the mid-2000s. Nonetheless, these gains appear relatively modest in comparison to a substantial and persistent performance advantage of U.S. immigrants, which is evident across the earnings distribution and among immigrants from the same source country. That this advantage persists even recently, when there is little to distinguish the Australian and U.S. systems of employment-based immigration, suggests to us that the difference primarily reflects the relative positive selectivity of U.S. immigrants owing to higher returns to skill in the U.S. and relative economic security of Australia and Canada. Overall, our findings suggest that while immigration policy has the potential to improve immigrant labour market performance on the margin, this potential is severely limited by large differences in the incentives of migrants of varying abilities and ambitions to settle in particular destination countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we describe the policy, selectivity, and domestic labour market differences that are likely to underlie the observed 2 There now exist a number of other studies examining the effectiveness of Australia and Canada's recent immigration policy reforms (Cobb-Clark 2003; Hawthorne 2008; Richardson and Lester 2004; Begin, Goyette, and Riddell 2010) . However, none of these papers attempt to account for the possible concomitant effects of migrant selectivity and domestic labour markets. An exception is Clarke and Skuterud (2013) which employs a similar strategy to that here, but uses data up to 2006 and does not include the United States comparison group. differences in the relative labour market performance of university-educated immigrants in Australia, Canada, and the United States. We then describe our empirical strategy for isolating the effect of policy, followed by a discussion of our results. We conclude with a discussion of how immigrant screening policies interact with migrant selectivity and broader features of domestic labour markets to affect the labour market performance of skilled immigrants.
Background
In the latter half of the 1990s, Australia made a number of reforms to its skilled-worker immigration program as part of a broader objective to increase the skilled-worker stream share of immigration inflows. In hindsight, these reforms amount to what is arguably the most significant reform of Australian immigration policy since its decision in 1979 to introduce a `point-system' for screening skilled migrants.
While the details are complex, and continue to evolve, one can distinguish two distinct pieces that would be expected to influence either the skills of university-educated migrants that are selected or their ability to successfully integrate into Australian labour markets.
First, in 1996 the government introduced a new temporary work visa scheme, known as the 457 visa; enabling employers to more easily recruit foreign skilled workers to fill job vacancies that could not be filled domestically. For July 2009, July 2011, and July 2013, the minimum annual salary for workers issued a 457 visa was $45,220, $49,330, and $53,900 respectively. These rates are below average weekly earnings in the overall Australian population, but considerably above the annual earnings of minimum wage workers. When combined with the longer-term growth in the number of international students studying at Australian post-secondary institutions, many of whom transition to employment 'bridging visas' following graduation, Australia has experienced a substantial increase in the transition of individuals from temporary visas to permanent residency, or what has been coined `two-step' migration.
The share of new permanent visas granted to on-shore applicants increased from 22 percent in 1997-98
to 50 percent by 2010-11. 3 Among those admitted in the skilled stream, 60 percent transitioned from a temporary visa by 2011, of which approximately 60 percent transitioned from a temporary 457 visa and 40 percent from an international student visa.
One would expect `two-step' immigrants to have superior long-term labour market outcomes for at least two reasons. 4 The empirical challenge in identifying the effects of the shift towards `two-step' immigration is that identifying transitions from temporary visas is typically not possible using the standard survey and Census data used to study immigrant labour market performance. Gregory (2014) uses information on country of birth in the Australian Labour Force Survey (LFS), together with the fact that non-English speaking (NESB) `two-step' migrants are much of prospective migrants, particularly difficult to measure skills, than what is evaluated in the 'point system,' allowing them to more effectively screen the skills and abilities of migrants whom they demand. Second, by being recruited directly from abroad, immigrants avoid job search at arrival. If preand post-migration job search are equivalent, the gains from `two-step' immigration may be only shortterm. However, to the extent that there are sunk costs in the migration decision, we would expect the outside options and reservation wages of immigrants who arrive in the destination country without prearranged employment to be lower, which may have longer-term effects on earnings. For example, immigrants may be forced to take low-wage `survival jobs' at arrival, but may experience difficulties transitioning out of these jobs (Skuterud and Su 2012).
In 1999, the Australian government also revised the criteria of its point system with the objective to `select for success' among principal applicants (Hawthorne 2005) . The key features of the reform were an introduction of pre-migration mandatory English-language tests and a formal system of assessing foreign credentials to insure that the professional skills that were being credited in the selection process would also be recognized by Australian employers. In addition, consistent with the push towards `two-step' migration, the system put increasing emphasis on pre-arranged employment and waived the work experience requirement for students completing qualifications at an Australian educational institution, thereby effectively placing greater weight on Australian qualifications in its points system (Birrell and Perry 2009) . Finally, new migrants were restricted from accessing income support programs in their first two years following migration.
One would expect all of these reforms to have improved labour market outcomes for new
Australian immigrants. The current evidence evaluating these changes is, however, somewhat mixed. more likely to have been initially admitted on student, as opposed to employment, visas, to provide evidence on the effects of the `two-step' system. His results suggest an increase in part-time employment rates of migrants admitted on student visas, but little change in the employment rates of those admitted on work visas. He is, however, unable to examine wage outcomes, which are not available in the Australian LFS data.
In response to mounting evidence of the failure of the point system to meet current labour grid would better predict long-term labour market success (Ferrer, Picot, and Riddell 2014 In sharp contrast to Australia and Canada, immigration policy in the U.S. has, as a result of political gridlock in Washington, remained essentially unchanged since passing its Immigration Act in 1990. A key objective of the 1990 reform was to shift immigration away from a system based exclusively on family-reunification to a system where selecting migrants on their education and skills plays a larger 5 While IRPA was passed in 2002, due to a significant backlog in processing permanent-residency applications, there was a significant lag in the implementation of the new point system. According to data from Begin, Goyette, and Riddell (2010) , by 2005 only 37% were being screened through the IRPA points grid. We, therefore, expect any benefit if IRPA to be observed in our data primarily in the latter half of the 2000s. 6 The Conservative government elected in 2006 also introduced a number of new immigration programs beyond the Federal Skilled Worker Program (the `point system'), including a Provincial Nominee (PN) program intended to increase the settlement of immigrants outside Toronto and Vancouver, and the Canadian Experience Class (CEC) program, intended to provide a pathway beyond the standard 'point system' for former international students and temporary foreign workers. However, as discussed in the following section, up to 2011 very few of the male university-educated immigrants that we focus on in our analysis were admitted under these new programs.
role. The screening mechanism introduced was a `two-step' system in which skilled foreign workers are recruited by U.S. employers through temporary work visas, most notably the H-1B visa targeting workers in "specialty occupations," and subsequently transition to permanent residency. The annual number of visas issued was, however, capped and the cap has fluctuated over the years. Lowell (2000) estimates the H-1B stock population taking into account H-1B annual inflows and expected emigration, deaths, and transitions to permanent residence. Her updated results, described in Kerr and Lincoln (2010) , point to significant growth through the 1990s, followed by a levelling off after 2000. Indeed, the share of new U.S. permanent residents admitted under the skill-stream increased in the first half of the 1990s, but has hovered around 15 percent since (Office of Immigration Statistics, various years).
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The leveling off of the skill-stream share is also confirmed by our own analysis of data from the to settle in particular destination countries (Borjas 1987) . The standard Roy model of migrant selectivity predicts that destination countries with higher levels of inequality, relative to the origin, will tend to attract relatively high-skilled migrants seeking higher returns to their skills, but relatively more so for destinations with higher levels of inequality. Similarly, destination countries with lower levels of inequality, relative to the origin, will tend to attract relatively less-skilled migrants as the relative compression of the income distribution provides a form of insurance for these workers, but relatively less so in destination countries with higher levels of inequality.
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The question for us then is, what is the difference in the levels of income inequality in Australia, Canada, and the United States and how have they evolved through the 1990s and 2000s.
In Table 1 , we report Gini coefficients of the distribution of market and disposable (post tax and transfer) income in the total population, as well as the ratio of the 90 th and 10 th percentiles of the disposable income distribution. While one could argue that it is the income distribution in the universityeducated population that is relevant for migrant selectivity in our analysis, it is unclear that this is the relevant distribution for university-educated immigrants who may anticipate facing challenges in attaining jobs commensurate with their education levels. We, therefore, focus instead on what has happened to inequality in both market (pre-tax and transfer) and disposable (post-tax and transfer) income in the total population using published data from the OECD. The inequality statistics reported in Table 1 have two key features relevant for our analysis. First, income inequality was highest in the U.S. The key advantage of comparing immigrants from a common origin country, such as China or India, is that differences in the relative performance of immigrants across destination countries effectively "differences out" the influence on migrant selectivity of factors emanating from the origin country. Nonetheless, in order to help us interpret changes over time in the performance of immigrants within destination countries, it is worth considering how inequality compares between Australia, Canada, and the U.S. and the set of origin countries that we consider.
Based on World Bank data, in the late 1980s China had similar levels of inequality to Australia, Canada, and the U.S., but Chinese inequality grew substantially more in the following two decades.
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This implies that Chinese immigrants should have been increasingly negatively selected in all three destination countries, but the level of this negative selection should have been greater in Australia and Canada where inequality levels are lower. Indian inequality has similarly grown, but the increase has not been very different from that in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Throughout the period of our analysis, inequality was slightly higher in India than in Australia and Canada, but considerably lower than in the United States. We would, therefore, expect Indian immigrants to the U.S. to be positively selected but negatively selected in Australia and Canada. As for the Philippines, inequality grew through the 1990s, but subsequently decreased through the 2000s returning to its levels of the early 1990s.
However, over the entire period it is considerably higher than in all three destination countries implying negative selectivity. Finally, Canadian immigrants to the U.S. should be positively selected, but this selectivity should have been reduced through the 1990s, but increased again through the 2000s. On other hand, U.S. immigrants to Canada should be negatively selected, and this negative selectivity should have increased through the 2000s.
Methodology

Data
Our empirical work examines Census and survey microdata files from the three countries spanning the period 1990-2011. Australia and Canada conduct quinquennial Censuses in common years. For Australia, 10 The World Bank data (World Development Indicators).
we accessed confidential data through the Australian Bureau of Statistics using a remote access data laboratory (RADL) system. In the years 1991 through 2001, these data provide random 1% samples of With some notable exceptions, discussed below, these data provide broadly comparable crosssectional data on specific demographic and labour force characteristics of individuals, as well as information on country of birth and year of arrival of the foreign-born population. These similarities enable a comparison of immigrant labour market performance across the three destination countries.
Several sample restrictions are imposed in order to create consistent samples. First, the sample is restricted to prime-age (25-59) males who have completed a university degree. We restrict attention to prime-age men in order to minimize the influence of sample selection issues arising from potentially differential latent labour force participation propensities of immigrant women. Since we are primarily interested in the potential for immigration policy to influence the labour market performance of new immigrants, we restrict attention to those with university degrees, because this group is most likely to have entered their destination countries as principal applicants through one of the skilled-worker immigration programs. 12 Second, since we are primarily interested in the relative performance of immigrants within their first five years following migration and our first year of data is from 1991, we limit the immigrant samples to individuals who migrated after 1985. Third, in order to avoid spurious correlations in our sample between age at migration and years since migration arising from our age restriction, we also exclude all immigrants whose current age and arrival cohort indicate a possibility that they entered their destination country before the age of 20. Finally, we exclude all Quebec residents from the Canadian sample, because the province of Quebec has historically administered their own immigrant screening policies, which have historically put relatively more emphasis on the Frenchlanguage abilities of prospective migrants and less on their human capital characteristics. By focusing on Canadian immigrants outside Quebec, our results are not only more likely to reflect the national-level 11 We use the sampling weights provided with the data, which are designed to insure the national representativeness of the final NHS sample, at least on observable dimensions. However, to the extent that university-educated immigrants who chose not to respond to the NHS were different on unobservable dimensions related to earnings from their native-born counterparts who did not respond, our estimates, particularly for the most recent arrival cohort will be biased. 12 As evidence, Canadian administrative data indicate that of the 487,845 university-educated men who became new permanent residents between 2000 and 2010, 82% entered as economic-class immigrants, and 77% of this group entered as principal applicants in the Federal Skilled Worker Program (ie., the `point system'). For Chinese and Indian immigrants, these proportions are even higher (91% and 74% for China; 80% and 84% for India).
policy changes described in Section 2, but also increase the comparability of the estimates by focusing on three English-speaking migrant destinations.
There are two differences in the Census data between the three destination countries that are especially relevant to our analysis. First, both the Australian and U.S. questionnaires ask all foreign-born individuals the year in which they first arrived in the destination country, but do not identify whether respondents are currently temporary and permanent residents. The Canadian Census (and 2011 NHS), on the other hand, identify the year in which permanent residency was obtained, but also samples temporary residents and provides an indicator distinguishing them. In order to make the samples as comparable as possible, we include temporary residents in the 1991-2011 Canadian data and use information (available for all respondents) on place of residence one and five years ago to identify their arrival cohort. 13 For current permanent residents, on the other hand, we assume their year of arrival is the year in which they became a permanent resident. As discussed in Section 2, this is less of a problem in the Canadian data, since 'two-step' migration is less common. Also, ignoring the years of Canadian residence prior to obtaining permanent residency should result in the estimated entry earnings of Canadian immigrants being upward biased, so that the relatively large entry earnings gaps of Canadian immigrants that we identify in the data will be, if anything, even larger.
The second inconsistency in our data is that the Canadian and U.S. data identify labour market earnings and weeks worked in the previous year, allowing us to construct weekly earnings. The Australian Census, however, only asks respondents to identify their usual weekly total income, including government transfers and investment income. To limit the amount of non-earnings income from the Australian data, we further restrict the samples used to estimate the earnings regressions (but not the employment regressions) to full-time workers. In Canada and the U.S., this is identified off a question asking respondents whether they worked mostly full-or part-time weekly hours in the previous year, whereas in Australia it is identified off a question identifying usual weekly hours in the previous year.
14 Finally, both the Canadian Census and the U.S. Census and ACS files contain population sampling weights, representing the inverse of the probability of inclusion in the sample. We standardize these weights, so that the cumulative sum of the weight variable is equal to the number of observations in each Census year, and use them throughout our analysis.
Empirical Specification
As discussed above, a key challenge in isolating the effects of immigrant screening policies on immigrant labour market outcomes is to account for differences in broader labour market conditions both within and across destination countries. To do so, we follow the standard approach of identifying these conditions off native-born workers in the destination countries. The difficulty is knowing which native-born workers are the most relevant comparison group for informing how new universityeducated male immigrants are affected by broader labour market conditions. The standard approach in the literature has been to compare immigrants to similarly aged natives. However, there is evidence from Canada and the U.S. that the value of foreign labour market experience has deteriorated over time and is essentially zero for the most recent cohorts (Friedberg 2000; Aydemir and Skuterud 2005) . This suggests that the integration experience of new immigrants is very much like all new labour market entrants. Indeed, Green and Worswick (2012) find evidence that half of the deterioration in the entry earnings of Canadian immigrants through the 1980s can be accounted for by changing labour market conditions affecting all new labour market entrants, as opposed to declining skill levels across immigrant arrival cohorts. There is also evidence that the macroeconomic conditions that immigrants face at entry have long-term effects for immigrant workers (Aydemir 2003) , similar to evidence found for new nativeborn labour market entrants (Oreopoulos, von Watcher, and Heisz 2012) .
Following the approach of Green and Worswick (2010) of comparing recent immigrants to native-born new labour market entrants, we examine changes over time in the employment rates and earnings of new immigrants by estimating the following empirical specification: 
where Yijrt is either an employment dummy variable or log weekly real earnings of individual i, from labour market entry cohort j, residing in geography r, observed in year t; Cj are six (6) cohort dummies indicating the period of labour market entry (1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010) ; f(ysejt) is quadratic years since labour market entry profile common to immigrants and natives; urrt is a detrended regional unemployment rate; fexpijr is years of foreign labour market experience; Xr is a vector of geography dummies indicating the city, state, or province of residence; and εijrt is a random error term with a conditional mean of zero.
the full years-since-entry profile up to age 59. For immigrants, on the other hand, we assume that the year of labour market entry is their year of arrival. Finally, foreign experience is calculated as the difference between an immigrant's age of arrival and the age of 24 and is assumed to be zero for nativeborn men. Year of arrival is, however, only identified in 5-year intervals for immigrants in the Australian data. To ensure that our results are not being driven by differences in measurement error, we construct similar intervals in the Canadian and U.S. data and use the midpoint of these intervals to obtain a unique year of arrival and age at arrival to define the years since entry (ysejt) and years of foreign experience (fexpijr) variables for immigrants.
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Note from equation (1) that we allow the linear term in the quadratic years-since-entry profile to vary by entry cohort for both natives and immigrants. However, to improve the efficiency of the estimates, particularly where we restrict attention to immigrants from a particular source country, we do not allow the effect of foreign experience on entry earnings to vary across immigrant entry cohorts.
However, the foreign experience effect is allowed to influence the slope of the immigrant-specific yearssince-entry profile. A negative estimate of the coefficient θ suggests lower post-migration wage growth for immigrants who arrive at older ages.
Of primary interest in our analysis is the comparison of the estimates of the immigrant cohort effects βjm for j=2,…,6 across destination countries, not only in terms of their historical values, but also their evolution over time. To the extent that immigrants face the same average skill prices as natives, these cohort effects reflect variation in the average quantity of skill of university-educated men. To see this, assume that the level of real weekly earnings is equal to the product of an individual's skill (Qij) and the price of that skill (Pijrt), where variation in prices across individuals could reflect heterogeneity in the types of skills individuals, outcomes of the job search process, or even discrimination. Log real weekly earnings are then given by yijrt = pijrt + qij. If the mean skill of natives does not vary across the nativeborn entry cohorts so that E(qik | j=k, Mijrt=0)=E (qil | j=l, Mijrt=0) for all k ≠ l, then:
so that the native entry cohort effects capture the change in average skill prices across cohorts relative to the base cohort 0. If we further assume that immigrants face the same average skill prices as natives within any period t=t*, that is E(pijrt|t=t*, Mijrt=1) = E(pijrt|t=t*,Mijrt=0), then:
so that the immigrant cohort effects capture differences in average skill between natives and immigrants who entered the labour market in the same year. Moreover, if mean native skill is cohortinvariant, then variation in the immigrant cohort effects over time must reflect changes in average immigrant skill across entry cohorts. It is in influencing this average skill level of university-educated immigrants that we expect immigrant screening policies to have their primary effect.
The assumption that immigrants receive the same labour market returns to their skills is no doubt a strong one. First, there is compelling evidence from Canada that immigrants face labour market discrimination in recruiting based on their names (Oreopoulos 2011) . However, we are primarily interested in how employment rates and earnings of immigrants from a particular origin country have evolved differently in Australia, Canada, and the United States. We find it difficult to think of reasons why differences in the extent of discrimination against immigrants could explain these differences. Of greater relevance, in our view, is the possibility that immigrants face greater job search frictions than similarly-educated natives. For example, migration may involve a sunk cost so that immigrants' outside job options are lower, thereby forcing them to lower their reservation wages. Or perhaps, immigrants lack the social networks of natives, which adversely impacts their job offer arrival rates. Consistent with this idea, Bowlus, Miyairi and Robinson (2016) find that lower job offer arrival rates can account for three-quarters of the earnings gap of Canadian immigrants. It is via this mechanism that we imagine `two-step' migration, which essentially avoids the job search process at arrival, will primarily enhance the labour market performance of immigrants.
We focus on entry employment rates and earnings and not assimilation for a number of reasons. First, assimilation will primarily reflect immigrants' post-migration human capital investments, which we think are less clearly related to the skills that immigrant selection policies, like the `point system,' are intended to screen. Second, our estimates of assimilation are also more likely than our estimates of entry earnings to be biased by non-random out-migration of immigrants. Of course, we are in part relying on established immigrants to identify our cohort effects, but we have explored outmigration rates in our data and they do not appear to be sizable. Lubotsky (2007) finds that outmigration rates from the U.S. are sizable, but we are restricting attention to university-educated men, who may have lower outmigration rates. Finally, as a practical consideration, we are most interested in the relative performance of the most recent arrival cohort (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , for whom any estimate of assimilation must ultimately be identified off the experiences of earlier cohorts.
We also estimate conditional (on cohort) quantile earnings regressions, which compare percentiles of the earnings of university-educated native-born and immigrant. As before, assuming the native skill distribution is cohort-invariant and that immigrants face the same prices for skills as natives at given points of their distributions, the estimated differentials reflect the relative skills of immigrants across the skill distribution. Given that we expect the criteria of the `point system,' such as Englishlanguage skills, to primarily screen skills at the lower end of the distribution, we would expect any advantage in Australian and Canadian immigrant skills to be most evident at the lower end of the lower end of the distribution.
Finally, income in the Australian Census questionnaire is reported in intervals. The standard approach, in the existing literature, is to transform these intervals into a continuous variable using the category midpoints. This requires that an arbitrary point be chosen for the unbounded top interval. To deal with both types of censoring, we estimate model (1) using a censored linear regression model, which we estimate by maximum likelihood. Specifically, for individual i in census year t we observe whether they have income in some interval (yL and yU), where the upper limit is infinity for the top category. The contribution to the likelihood of each individual is Pr(yL ≤ yit ≤ yU). This essentially amounts to estimating an order Probit model with known cut points.
Results
In this section we discuss our estimates of the entry-earnings coefficient estimates using our sample of full-time, university-educated, male workers. For natives, the estimates of βj in equation (1) In Table 2 , we report the estimates using the pooled sample of immigrants from all origin countries. The results for the first two cohorts, corresponding to labour market entrants of the late 1980s and early 1990s, show a markedly different starting point for Australian and Canadian immigrants than for U.S. immigrants. Whereas immigrants to these two countries performed poorly relative to native-born new entrants (between 16 and 30 log points lower in Australia and 18 to 20 log points lower in Canada), there is no evidence of a performance gap among university-educated immigrants in the United States. This difference is consistent with U.S. immigrants being relatively positively selected owing to the historically higher levels of U.S. inequality in both market and disposable income.
As noted in a previous section, the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s was characterized by relatively little change in selection policy in Australia and Canada. Moreover, the statistics presented in Table 1 suggest that, during this same period, inequality in Australia and Canada worsened, but particularly in Australia. The improvement in entry earnings in Australia between the 1986-90 and the 1991-95 cohorts (14 log points), and to a lesser extent in Canada (1.5 log points), is consistent with this rising inequality. With both a small increase in inequality in the U.S and the passing of the Immigrant Act in 1990, it is not possible to disentangle changes in migrant selectivity from change in selection policy over this period.
The late 1990s and 2000s saw a movement in all three countries towards more aggressive selection policies. In the U.S., the estimates in Table 2 The improvement in entry earnings of successive immigrant cohorts in Australia appears consistent with its immigration reforms, including the increase in `two-step' immigration. This is unlikely to be the result of other changes in the labour market affecting all new entrants, as the entry earnings of new cohorts of Australian-born workers remained stable during the period. The last entry cohort of immigrants to Australia, however, saw a significant deterioration in their entry earnings (we discuss this result in more detail below). Finally, new cohorts of Canadian immigrants continue to perform poorly on the earnings front, with earnings between 20 and 29 log points lower than Canadian-born entrants.
However, the reduction of the earnings gap of the last cohort of Canadian immigrants to 13 log points is consistent with reforms to the Canadian `point system' that occurred in the mid-2000s.
The findings of Antecol, Kuhn, and Trejo (2006) using data up to 1990/1991 emphasize the distinction between employment and earnings outcomes in immigrant assimilation patterns. In the remaining columns of Table 2 , we report the results from estimating equation (1) using an indicator of employment as the dependent variable. We find no evidence of lower entry effects in Australian employment rates similar to Antecol, Kuhn and Trejo (2006) . 17 In fact, unlike in Canada and the U.S., employment rates of Australian immigrants tend to be similar to those of their native-born counterparts and, if anything, have been improving over time consistent, in particular, with the shift towards 'twostep' immigration in Australia. In sharp contrast, the employment rates of Canadian immigrants consistently fall below those of natives entering the labour market in the same period. However, there is some evidence of improvements beginning with the late 1990s Canadian arrival cohort, so that for the most recent cohort the gap is only 4.1 percentage points. Finally, in the U.S., immigrants have historically shown employment rates that are between 3.4 and 4.4 percentage points lower than for new native entrants. However, as in Canada, there is evidence of improvement for more recent U.S. arrivals, so that by the 2000s immigrant employment rates appear equivalent to their native-born counterparts. Once again, these patterns are broadly consistent with the evolution of immigration policy reforms, in particular the growth in H-1B visas during the late 1990s.
To the extent that migrant selectivity also affects immigrant employment propensities, the results in the last three columns of Table 2, at least . 19 There is also some evidence that immigrants from this most recent arrival cohort are being sorted into lowerpaying occupations. Controlling for broad occupation reduces the estimated entry effect for the most recent cohort from -0.149 to -0.079. Moreover, controlling for broad occupation and excluding India reduces the estimated entry effect for the 2006-10 cohort by almost 70%.
Overall, the results from Table 2 Table 2 reflect policy reforms, it appears that policy effects were not uniform along the immigrant earnings distribution. In Australia, the gains are initially largest at the lower end of the distribution, arguably most consistent with the ramping of its `point system' criteria, but are more robust in the middle of the distribution, perhaps reflecting the growth of `two-step'
immigration. Unfortunately, due to the censoring of income data in the Australian Census, we are unable to obtain Australian estimates for the 90 th percentile. However, the comparison of the 10 th and median estimates does suggest the deterioration for the most recent cohort was concentrated at the lower end of the distribution.
In Canada, the improvement for the most recent arrival cohort is more evident at both the lower and upper end of the distribution than in the middle. While we would expect pre-migration language tests and credential assessment to improve earnings at the lower end of the distribution, the relative gains at the upper end of the distribution are more surprising. Moreover, as a result of these gains, for the most arrival cohort (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) there is little difference in the performance of Canadian immigrants at the 90 th percentile relative to their U.S. counterparts. Rather, the large performance advantage of U.S. immigrants appears to primarily reflect much lower earnings of Canadian immigrants 20 The income data in the Australian census is interval coded and top-coded. Once attention is restricted to university educated male workers, there are a considerable number of both native-born and immigrant observations that are censored from above. In the presence of considerable real wage growth during the 2000s, this censoring becomes particularly important in the 2011 census where the top codes remain the same as those in 2006. As a result, it is not possible to estimate a conditional quantile regression for the 90 th percentile for Australia. In order to estimate the quantile regressions, the expected income within each (income) interval is estimated by estimating an interval regression with no covariates. This calculates E[ln(Yijrt)|ln(YL≤ln(Yijrt)≤YU)]. Since the interval regression is based upon a normal distribution for ln (Yijrt) , this expectation only depends upon the estimated first and second moments of the normal distribution. This expected income within an interval is used as the dependent variable in the quantile regressions.
at the lower end of the distribution. This disadvantage at the lower end is also apparent in the Australian-U.S. comparison. Given that one would expect the `point systems' of these countries to primarily affect earnings by screening out migrants who are expected to be particularly unsuccessful, the historically larger gaps at the lower end in Australia and Canada, appear more consistent with migrant selectivity driven by differences in income inequality across destination countries.
Finally, in the U.S. the improvements in immigrant earnings in the late-1990s appear strongest in the middle and top of the distribution. This is broadly consistent with the fact the hypothesis that these gains, at least in part, reflect the growth of the H-1B program in the late 1990s, since one would expect the H-1B program, which targets specialty occupations, to primarily boost average immigrant earnings by increasing the inflow of immigrants at the upper end of the earnings income distribution.
The current literature emphasizes the importance of source-country distributions in understanding differences in the performance of immigrants across destination countries. Moreover, the analysis of Borjas (1993) , and more recently Clarke and Skuterud (2013) , suggest that `point systems' work primarily by shifting the source-country distribution immigrants. However, an important distinguishing feature of our analysis is our focus on university-educated workers. It turns out that this focus also serves to significantly narrow differences in the origin-country distributions of Australian, Canadian, and U.S. immigrants. The largest differences are that Australia receives more universityeducated immigrants from Europe and Oceania (24.3 and 5.1 percent, respectively for the most recent cohort, compared to 14.8 and 1.5 for Canada, and 16.8 and 1.3 for the U.S.); Canada receives more from North Africa and the Middle East (10 percent of the most recent cohort, compared to 2.9 for Australia and 1.5 percent for the U.S.); and the U.S. receives more Latin American migrants (17.8 percent of the most recent cohort, compared to 7.6 percent for Canada and 3 percent for Australia). Moreover, there is relatively little change over this period in the source country distributions, with the exception of a shift away from European towards Asian immigration that is evident in all three destination countries.
Despite the relative similarity of the source-country distributions in our university-educated sample, it is possible for small differences in source countries to have comparatively large effects on average immigrant performance if migrant selectivity is evolving differently across countries. For example, if inequality has always been higher in Latin America than in Australia, Canada, and U.S., but it increased less in Latin America through the 1990s and 2000s, we would expect Latin American migrants to all three destination countries to be less negatively selected in the late 2000s than in the early 1990s.
However, since a larger share of U.S. immigrants has always come from Latin America, this change in migrant selectivity will improve the average relative earnings performance of all U.S. immigrants more.
To insure that the improvements in immigrant outcomes that we identified in Table 2 reflect the immigration policy reforms, as opposed to migrant selectivity, we compare the relative performance of immigrants originating from the same country. By doing so, any effect of migrant selectivity should reflect "push" and "pull" factors emanating from the destination, and not the origin, country Figure 2 shows the relative immigrant entry earnings estimates by country of origin. We perform the analysis for three countries of origin with large enough samples to obtain statistically meaningful estimates: China, India and the Philippines. We also add North America as an additional group that includes U.S. immigrants in Canada, Canadian immigrants in the U.S., and Canadian and U.S. immigrants in Australia. In each graph, the first group of bars shows the entry earnings of different cohorts of immigrants to Australia; the second group show similar estimates for Canada; and the third group shows the corresponding estimates for the United States. The estimated coefficients and standard errors are reported in Table 2 in the appendix.
Chinese immigrants fare substantially worse in Australia than in any other destination country, and much worse than the average immigrant to Australia. However, their entry earnings have been improving for successive cohorts, which is consistent with selection policies increasing requirements for language and the shift toward `two-step' immigration. Chinese immigrants in Canada also suggest a trend towards improving relative entry earnings. However, the evolution is complicated by a substantial With the exception of the U. S for the early 1990s, the entry earnings of successive cohorts of Indian immigrants appear remarkably constant. Over our sample period, the level of inequality in India exceeds that in Australia and Canada, but is less than the level of inequality in the U.S. The migrant selectivity hypothesis implies Indian immigrants to the U.S. should be positively selected and negatively selected in Australia and Canada. The entry earnings in Figure 2 are consistent with this ranking of Gini coefficients. Moreover, over the sample period, inequality in India grew at approximately the same rate as that in Australia, Canada, and the U.S. (Topalova 2008) . Overall, the patterns for the entry earnings for Indian immigrants appear consistent with the long-run differences in the level of inequality and the relative ranking of the Gini coefficients between India and the destination countries. Despite considerable developments in immigrant selection policy in Australia, these policies seem somewhat ineffective at improving entry earnings for Indian immigrants. The exception is the improvement in entry earnings in the U.S. in the early 1990s, concomitant with the expansion in the H1-B program. There is also some evidence that the changes in immigration policy have led to some improvements in entry earnings for the most recent arrival cohort.
Finally, Filipino immigrants show, on average, lower entry earnings than any of the other groups we examine here. However, there are important differences in the evolution of their performance over time. Like Chinese immigrants to Australia, Filipino new entrants traditionally performed worse than the average immigrant to Australia. However, each cohort improved entry earnings over the 1990s, from more than 50 log points lower earnings than the native born to around 20 log points lower by 2010.
Filipino immigrants to Canada earned substantially lower earnings (50 log points lower) than the native born and only a slight improvement can be observed for the latest cohort. The improvement in earnings observed for the average immigrant to the U.S. does not apply to Filipino immigrants, who typically perform below or at the same level than the native born. Similar to China, the level of inequality in the Philippines is greater than that for Australia, Canada, and the United States. The migrant selectivity hypothesis implies that immigrants from the Philippines should be negatively selected. In addition, inequality in the Philippines grew at approximately the same rate as that in Australia, Canada, and the U.S., implying little change in the (negative) selectivity of immigrants. In light of this, the migrant selectivity hypothesis would predict relatively less negative selectivity in the United States, relative to Australia and Canada, with little change in the entry earnings for successive arrival cohorts. The timing of the considerable improvement in the entry earnings for Filipino immigrants to Australia in the later 1990s, and the improvement for Filipino immigrants to Canada for the most recent cohort, is consistent with the evolution of selection policies in these destination countries One possibility we have not considered so far, is that the selection process is affecting the occupational backgrounds of immigrants or their occupational choices following migration. In Canada, Asians arriving during the 1990s and early 2000s were highly concentrated in information (IT) sector, whereas Filipino university-educated men concentrated in less skilled occupations unlikely to yield high entry earnings. Similarly, the improvement in immigrant entry earnings in the U.S. appears to be driven by the performance of Indian immigrants, which have been concentrated in highly paid occupations in STEM fields (Borjas and Friedberg 2009 ). To take a closer look into this possibility, we consider entry earnings of workers in STEM and non-STEM occupations. Results from this analysis can be seen in Table   3 , where the first 26 columns report estimates for the subsample of STEM workers and the last 3 columns for non-STEM workers.
The results in table 3 show that most of the trends we have discussed here are to a great extent a phenomenon of STEM related occupations. 21 The superior entry earnings of immigrants to the U.S. are almost exclusively associated with STEM occupations, consistent with the influence of the H-1B
program. In contrast, the pattern in entry earnings in Australia is somewhat similar between STEM and non-STEM occupations, which we might expect given that the Australia's 457 program has been less concentrated among workers in STEM fields. In addition, that the effect of ramping up Australia's `point system' to have been larger among STEM-employed immigrants. Finally, the improvement in entry earnings of the most recent Canadian cohort is evident among immigrants employed in both STEM and non-STEM occupations. As in Australia, this appears consistent with policy reforms having broad effects.
Conclusion
There are two main findings of our analysis. First, in contrast to much of the current literature, we find evidence of improving relative labour market earnings of immigrant university-educated men through the 1990s and 2000s in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Moreover, the timing of these gains appears broadly consistent with the immigration policy reforms within these countries: the expansion of the H-1B program in the U.S. in the late 1990s; the ramping up of Australia's point system and shift towards `two-step' migration in the late 1990s; and the broadly similar policy reforms in Canada in the mid-2000s. However, despite these gains, our analysis also points to a much larger and persistent performance advantage in the full-time earnings of university-educated immigrant men in the United
States. This advantage is evident even among immigrants from the same source country and tends to be larger among immigrants employed in non-STEM jobs and at the lower end of the earnings distribution.
One interpretation of the exceptional performance of U.S. skilled immigrants is that `two-step' immigration, which accounts for the migration pathway of roughly three-quarters of the U.S. immigrants in our sample, leads to better outcomes, because immigrants avoid job search at arrival. There are two reasons we think this interpretation is lacking. It also seems unlikely to us that the large U.S. performance advantage reflects either the beneficial effects of basing immigrant selection on family-reunification objectives, emphasized by Duleep and Regets (1992) , or lower levels of labour market discrimination in the United States. Less than one-quarter of our U.S. sample initially entered the U.S. as permanent residents. Therefore, less than one-quarter of our U.S. sample are likely to be family-stream immigrants (since there are many other direct pathways to a `green card,' including humanitarian and various employment-based programs). In comparison, 13 percent of new permanent residents in Canada through the 2000s entered under a family-stream program. 22 Since, family-stream migrants are likely to comprise a similar small share of our Australian, Canadian, and U.S. samples, it seems highly unlikely that the large difference in their performance reflects these migrants. We also find it difficult to conceive of reasons why Indian, Chinese, or Filipino university-educated immigrants would experience more discrimination in Australian and Canadian labour markets than in the United States. Certainly, we are not aware of any evidence supportive of this rationalization of our findings.
While we cannot rule out that differences in entry earnings between countries do not partially reflect skill prices, in our view, the substantial earnings performance advantage of U.S. immigrants appears most consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. university-educated migrants are relatively positively selected owing to persistently higher levels of economic inequality in the U.S. than in Australia and Canada. Moreover, the fact that the performance advantage is largest at the lower end of the earnings distribution, suggests that the U.S. advantage is primarily driven by the relative economic security of Australia's and Canada's more generous social welfare systems, and the relative negative migrant selection it induces, as opposed to higher skill prices in the United States.
22 Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain similar estimates of immigration pathways for university-educated men in Australia. Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly earnings. For Australia, the median regression results are for the 45 th percentile. Regressions use a sample of fulltime, university-educated, male workers. The first six columns show results for a quantile regression at the tenth percentile. Columns 7 to 10 show results for the median (Canada and the US only) and columns 11 to 14 show results for the top 90 th percentile (Canada and the US only).Additional controls in the regression include geographic indicators (see text for a detailed explanation of geographical indicator in each country) 36 Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly earnings. Regressions use a sample of full-time, university-educated, male workers. Panel 1, restricts the immigrant sample to Chinese immigrants, panel 2 to Indian immigrants, panel 3 to Filipino immigrants and panel 4 to "north American" immigrants. Only coefficients for immigrants are shown. Additional controls include all variables specified in Table 1 
